Sources of Domain-Independence in the Formal Sciences
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Any discussion of the concept of “formal science” must acknowledge that the term is used in different ways, for different purposes, by different people. For some, the formal sciences are defined by the exclusive use of deductive methods for discovering, or reasoning about, the properties of formal, abstract systems. On this view, the formal sciences are synonymous with mathematics, formal logic, and certain branches of linguistics and computer science that emphasize the study of formal languages. For others, “formal science” means something like “exact science”, or “formalized science”. On this view, any scientific discipline that places heavy emphasis on mathematical or logical formalization of key theoretical concepts and theories, could be described as a formal science. This latter conception of formal science is much more liberal than the former, and would include all of physics, much of chemistry, and some parts of biology, ecology, psychology and economics, as well as newer computationoriented disciplines like artificial life and artificial intelligence that do not fit easily within the traditional classification of the sciences.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Kevin de Laplante, Certainty and Domain-Independence in the Sciences of Complexity: A Critique of James Franklin's Account of Formal Science.
James Franklin (1999). Structure and Domain-Independence in the Formal Sciences. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30:721-723.
James Franklin (1994). The Formal Sciences Discover the Philosophers' Stone. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 25 (4):513-533.
Leon Horsten & Igor Douven (2008). Formal Methods in the Philosophy of Science. Studia Logica 89 (2):151 - 162.
Jean-Yves Beziau (2008). What is “Formal Logic”? Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 13:9-22.
Kevin de Laplante, Response to Franklin's Comments on 'Certainty and Domain-Independence in the Sciences of Complexity'.
Emily Grosholz (1992). Objects and Structures in the Formal Sciences. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:251 - 260.
Kevin T. Kelly (1988). Formal Learning Theory and the Philosophy of Science. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:413 - 423.
Selmer Bringsjord, Micah Clark & Joshua Taylor (forthcoming). Sophisticated Knowledge Representation and Reasoning Requires Philosophy. In Ruth Hagengruber (ed.), Philosophy's Relevance in Information Science.
E. J. Lowe (2011). The Rationality of Metaphysics. Synthese 178 (1):99-109.
Catarina Dutilh Novaes (2011). The Different Ways in Which Logic is (Said to Be) Formal. History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (4):303 - 332.
Barry Smith (2004). Beyond Concepts: Ontology as Reality Representation. In Formal Ontology in Information Systems (FOIS).
Franklin M. Fisher (1960). On the Analysis of History and the Interdependence of the Social Sciences. Philosophy of Science 27 (2):147-158.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads9 ( #378,726 of 1,934,362 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #434,317 of 1,934,362 )
How can I increase my downloads?