David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 137 (3):335 - 367 (2008)
Philosophers from Hart to Lewis, Johnston and Bennett have expressed various degrees of reservation concerning the doctrine of double effect. A common concern is that, with regard to many activities that double effect is traditionally thought to prohibit, what might at first look to be a directly intended bad effect is really, on closer examination, a directly intended neutral effect that is closely connected to a foreseen bad effect. This essay examines the extent to which the commonsense concept of intention supports a reasonably consistent and coherent application of double effect. Two important conclusions are these: (1) a number of traditionally proscribed activities involve a kind of “targeting” of innocents that can be taken to exhibit a direct intention to harm them; (2) a direct intention to harm need not involve a desire to harm in any ordinary sense of the latter expression.
|Keywords||Intention Targeting Desire Double Effect Bennett Sellars|
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References found in this work BETA
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
J. L. Austin (1979). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
Jonathan Francis Bennett (1995). The Act Itself. Oxford University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Citations of this work BETA
Charles Douglas (2009). End-of-Life Decisions and Moral Psychology: Killing, Letting Die, Intention and Foresight. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 6 (3):337-347.
Alexander R. Pruss (2013). The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of Double Effect. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.
Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2013). So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short. Noûs 49 (1):n/a-n/a.
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