David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 137 (3):335 - 367 (2008)
Philosophers from Hart to Lewis, Johnston and Bennett have expressed various degrees of reservation concerning the doctrine of double effect. A common concern is that, with regard to many activities that double effect is traditionally thought to prohibit, what might at first look to be a directly intended bad effect is really, on closer examination, a directly intended neutral effect that is closely connected to a foreseen bad effect. This essay examines the extent to which the commonsense concept of intention supports a reasonably consistent and coherent application of double effect. Two important conclusions are these: (1) a number of traditionally proscribed activities involve a kind of “targeting” of innocents that can be taken to exhibit a direct intention to harm them; (2) a direct intention to harm need not involve a desire to harm in any ordinary sense of the latter expression.
|Keywords||Intention Targeting Desire Double Effect Bennett Sellars|
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
J. L. Austin (1979). Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press.
Gilbert Harman (1986). Change in View. MIT Press.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Shelly Kagan (1989). The Limits of Morality. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Alexander R. Pruss (2013). The Accomplishment of Plans: A New Version of the Principle of Double Effect. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69.
Dana Kay Nelkin & Samuel C. Rickless (2015). So Close, Yet So Far: Why Solutions to the Closeness Problem for the Doctrine of Double Effect Fall Short. Noûs 49 (2):376-409.
Charles Douglas (2009). End-of-Life Decisions and Moral Psychology: Killing, Letting Die, Intention and Foresight. [REVIEW] Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 6 (3):337-347.
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