Graduate studies at Western
Communication and Cognition 34 (1):121-138 (2001)
|Abstract||This essay is a defence of the traditional notion of qualia - as properties of consciousness that are ineffable, intrinsic, private and immediately apprehensible - against the eliminative attempts of Daniel Dennett in the influential article "Quining Qualia." It is suggested that a thorough exploration of the concept is an appropriate starting point for future explanations of qualia, and the essay ends with some possible explanations of the four traditional properties.|
|Keywords||Consciousness Metaphysics Qualia Dennett, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
R. C. Pradhan (2002). Why Qualia Cannot Be Quined. Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research 19 (2):85-102.
Sydney Shoemaker (1990). Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Supplement 50 (Supplement):109-131.
Tere Vaden (2001). Qualifying Qualia Through the Skyhook Test. Inquiry 44 (2):149-170.
Justin Sytsma, Does Heterophenomenology Concede Too Much? Experiments on the Folk Theory of Consciousness.
Daniel C. Dennett (1994). Instead of Qualia. In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum.
P. (2000). Naturalizing Qualia, Destroying Qualia. Dialogos 35 (76):65-83.
Manuel Garcia-Carpintero (2003). Qualia That It is Right to Quine. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.
Bredo C. Johnsen (1997). Dennett on Qualia and Consciousness: A Critique. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):47-82.
Drakon Nikolinakos (2000). Dennett on Qualia: The Case of Pain, Smell and Taste. Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):505 – 522.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads116 ( #5,814 of 739,304 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,222 of 739,304 )
How can I increase my downloads?