Conscious experience, reduction and identity: Many gaps, one solution

Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-246 (2004)
This paper considers the so-called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl's "dual-access theory," is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although dual-access theory is a version of the mind-body identity thesis, it in no way "eliminates" conscious experience; rather, it provides a parsimonious and explanatorily fruitful theory of the consciousness-body relation which faithfully preserves the nature of conscious experience while going quite far in "bridging" the various explanatory gaps distinguished below
Keywords Consciousness  Experience  Identity  Metaphysics  Reduction
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Joseph Levine (1997). Recent Work on Consciousness. American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4):379-404.
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