Review of Sociology 15 (1):5-16 (2009)
|Abstract||I argue that, despite recent attempts, the strong program in the sociology of knowledge cannot be applied as a general method of inquiry in the history of ideas. My main point is that its methodological commitments only allow the strong program to be fruitful in those fields of knowledge whose content can be given by truth conditions. But even in these fields sociological questions can be asked that are not sensitive to truth conditional content. In these cases, as I argue, a hermeneutic method is more promising.|
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