Counterfactuals vs. conditional probabilities: A critical analysis of the counterfactual theory of information
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):45 – 60 (2008)
|Abstract||Cohen and Meskin 2006 recently offered a counterfactual theory of information to replace the standard probabilistic theory of information. They claim that the counterfactual theory fares better than the standard account on three grounds: first, it provides a better framework for explaining information flow properties; second, it requires a less expensive ontology; and third, because it does not refer to doxastic states of the information-receiving organism, it provides an objective basis. In this paper, I show that none of these is really an advantage. Moreover, the counterfactual theory fails to satisfy one of the basic properties of information flow, namely the Conjunction principle. Thus, I conclude, there is no reason to give up the standard probabilistic theory for the counterfactual theory of information.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Mark Ryan & Pierre-Yves Schobbens (1997). Counterfactuals and Updates as Inverse Modalities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 6 (2):123-146.
Luciano Floridi (2008). Understanding Epistemic Relevance. Erkenntnis 69 (1):69 - 92.
Ivar Hannikainen (2011). Might-Counterfactuals and the Principle of Conditional Excluded Middle. Disputatio 4 (30):127-149.
Richard Otte (1987). Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
Douglas Kutach (2002). The Entropy Theory of Counterfactuals. Philosophy of Science 69 (1):82-104.
Aidan Lyon (2010). Deterministic Probability: Neither Chance nor Credence. Synthese 182 (3):413-432.
Andrea Scarantino (2008). Shell Games, Information, and Counterfactuals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):629 – 634.
Jonathan Cohen (2006). An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.
Aaron Meskin & Jonathan Cohen (2008). Counterfactuals, Probabilities, and Information: Response to Critics. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):635 – 642.
Aaron Meskin (2006). An Objective Counterfactual Theory of Information. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333-352.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads17 ( #77,993 of 722,713 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,247 of 722,713 )
How can I increase my downloads?