Christopher Hill: Consciousness
Erkenntnis 77 (1) (2012)
| Abstract | Christopher Hill: Consciousness Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9373-8 Authors Erhan Demircioglu, Koc University, Rumeli Feneri Yolu, 34450 Sariyer, Istanbul, Turkey Journal Erkenntnis Online ISSN 1572-8420 Print ISSN 0165-0106 | |||||||||
| Keywords | Consciousness Representationalism Phenomenal Concept Strategy Pain Intentionalism | |||||||||
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