Supervenient causation and programme explanation

Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (1):83-93 (2002)
Abstract
Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Jaegwon Kim put forward two models of higher-level causal explanation. Advocates of both versions are inclined to draw the conclusion that the models don't differ substantially. I argue, on the contrary, that there are relevant metaphysical differences between Jackson and Pettit's notion of programme explanation on the one hand, and Kim's idea of supervenient causation on the other. These can be traced back to underlying differences between the contents of their physicalisms
Keywords Causation  Metaphysics  Mind  Physicalism  Supervenience
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