Two kinds of mental realism

Abstract
I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component of realism about folk psychology, and from this I separate realism about mental entities as an ontological commitment towards them. I point out that the two views are mutually independent, which provides the possibility of considering folk psychology as not being in cognitive competition with scientific psychology. At the end I make a tentative suggestion as to how to interpret the former in order to avoid this conflict.
Keywords Factualism  Folk psychology  Mental realism  Mental fictionalism  Ontological commitment
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,374
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
Chris Daly (2005). So Where's the Explanation? In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Clarendon. 85.
Donald Davidson (2010). What Metaphors Mean. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 31.

View all 25 references

Citations of this work BETA
Tamás Demeter (2010). In Defence of Empty Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):195-197.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-08-10

Total downloads

62 ( #23,128 of 1,096,840 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #31,184 of 1,096,840 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.