1. Tamás Demeter (2009). Two Kinds of Mental Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1):59-71.
    I argue that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism, and I draw some lessons for the realism-antirealism debate. Although it is already at hand, the distinction has not yet been drawn clearly. The difference to be shown consists in what realism is about: it may be either about the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities. I specify the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse as the central component of realism about folk psychology, and from this I separate realism about mental entities as an ontological commitment towards them. I point out that the two views are mutually independent, which provides the possibility of considering folk psychology as not being in cognitive competition with scientific psychology. At the end I make a tentative suggestion as to how to interpret the former in order to avoid this conflict.
    Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |  
     
    My bibliography  |
     
    Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | At my library
    51 downloads  |  Added to index: 2009-08-10  |  Mark as duplicate  |  Remove from index  |  Revision history
    Bookmark and Share