David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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For many natural scientists, design, conceived as the action of an intelligent agent, is not a fundamental creative force in nature. Rather, material mechanisms, characterized by chance and necessity and ruled by unbroken laws, are thought sufficient to do all nature’s creating. Darwin’s theory epitomizes this rejection of design.
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Thomas A. C. Reydon (2012). How-Possibly Explanations as Genuine Explanations and Helpful Heuristics: A Comment on Forber. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 43 (1):302-310.
Don Fallis (2007). Toward an Epistemology of Intellectual Property. Journal of Information Ethics 16 (2):34-51.
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