Three Views of Theoretical Knowledge

Abstract
Of the three views of theoretical knowledge which form the focus of this article, the first has its source in the work of Russell, the second in Ramsey, and the third in Carnap. Although very different, all three views subscribe to a principle I formulate as ‘the structuralist thesis’; they are also naturally expressed using the concept of a Ramsey sentence. I distinguish the framework of assumptions which give rise to the structuralist thesis from an unproblematic emphasis on the importance of ‘structural’ differences for the analysis and interpretation of theories belonging to the exact sciences, and I review a number of logical properties of Ramsey sentences using very simple arithmetical theories and their models. I then develop a reconstruction of the views of Russell, Ramsey, and Carnap that clarifies the interrelationships among them by appealing to aspects of the arithmetical examples that inform my discussion of Ramsey sentences. I conclude with an account of the philosophical basis of the structuralist thesis and the fundamental difficulty to which it leads
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    References found in this work BETA
    William Demopoulos (2003). On the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):371-403.
    Jeffrey Ketland (2004). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
    Jeffrey Ketland (2004). Empirical Adequacy and Ramsification. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):287-300.
    Ulrich E. Stegmann (2009). Dna, Inference, and Information. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):1-17.
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    Similar books and articles
    William Demopoulos (2003). On the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (3):371-403.
    Hanspeter Rings (1987). Das strukturalistische Problem der theoretischen Begriffe und seine Lösung. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 18 (1-2):296-312.
    Pierre Cruse (2004). Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
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