Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):117–137 (2008)
|Abstract||This paper situates abortion in the context of women’s duties to themselves. I argue that the fundamental Kantian requirement to respect oneself as a rational being, combined with Kanrs view of our animal nature, form the basis for a view of pregnancy and abortion that focuses on women’s agency and characters without diminishing the importance of their bodies and emotions. The Kantian view of abortion that emerges takes abortion to be morally problematic, but sometimes permissible, and sometimes even required.After sketching Kant’s account of duties to oneself, I discuss the challenges pregnancy poses to women’s agency. I then argue that abortion is morally problematic because it is antagonistic to an important subset of morally useful emotions that we have self-regarding duties to protect and cultivate; thus, there is a rebuttable deliberative presumption against maxims of abortion for indination-based ends. I close by considering objections.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Clementine Rossier, Abortion: An Open Secret? Abortion and Social Network Involvement in Burkina Faso.
F. M. Kamm (1992). Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
Andrea Whittaker (2004). Abortion, Sin, and the State in Thailand. Routledgecurzon.
A. Giubilini (2012). Abortion and the Argument From Potential: What We Owe to the Ones Who Might Exist. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (1):49-59.
David F. Walbert (1973). Abortion, Society, and the Law. Cleveland [Ohio]Press of Case Western Reserve University.
Lara Denis (2007). Abortion and Kant's Formula of Universal Law. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):547-580.
Gail Weiss (1995). Sex-Selective Abortion: A Relational Approach. Hypatia 10 (1):202 - 217.
Lara Denis (2008). Animality and Agency: A Kantian Approach to Abortion. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):117-37.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads63 ( #14,732 of 549,359 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,418 of 549,359 )
How can I increase my downloads?