David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In my opinion, the two main topics in the <span class='Hi'>philosophy</span> of mind are content and consciousness, and they have received about equal attention from me. As the title of my ﬁrst book, Content and Consciousness (1969) suggested, that is the order in which they must be addressed: ﬁrst, a theory of content or intentionality--a phenomenon more fundamental than consciousness--and then, building on that foundation, a theory of consciousness. Over the years I have found myself recapitulating this basic structure twice, partly in order to respond to various philosophical objections, but more importantly, because my research on foundational issues in cognitive science led me into diﬀerent aspects of the problems. The articles in the ﬁrst half of Brainstorms (1978a) composed in eﬀect a more detailed theory of content, and the articles in the second half were concerned with speciﬁc problems of consciousness. The second recapitulation devoted a separate volume to each half: The Intentional Stance (1987a) is all and only about content; Consciousness Explained (1991a) presupposes the theory of content in that volume and builds an expanded theory of consciousness. My more recent books, Darwin's Dangerous Idea (1995) and Kinds of Minds (1996), extend the scope of my earlier work, bringing out the evolutionary foundations of both the theory of intentional systems and the theory of consciousness. A summary of both of these in their current versions follows a review of how I got there.
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