David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cognition 79 (1):221-37 (2001)
Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness. A useful metaphor for keeping this elusive idea in focus is that consciousness is rather like fame in the brain. It is not a privileged medium of representation, or an added property some states have; it is the very mutual accessibility that gives some informational states the powers that come with a subject's consciousness of that information. Like fame, consciousness is not a momentary condition, or a purely dispositional state, but rather a matter of actual influence over time. Theorists who take on the task of accounting for the aftermath that is critical for consciousness often appear to be leaving out the Subject of consciousness, when in fact they are providing an analysis of the Subject, a necessary component in any serious theory of consciousness
|Keywords||*Consciousness States *Models *Neuropsychology|
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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (2007). Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
Elizabeth Schechter (2012). The Switch Model of Split-Brain Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):203 - 226.
Marc Champagne (2009). Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification. Dialogue 48 (01):145-183.
Josh Weisberg (2008). Same Old, Same Old: The Same-Order Representational Theory of Consciousness and the Division of Phenomenal Labor. Synthese 160 (2):161-181.
Bernard J. Baars & Stan Franklin (2009). Consciousness is Computational: The Lida Model of Global Workspace Theory. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (01):23-32.
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