'Beyond A- and B-time' Reconsidered

Philosophia 38 (4):741-753 (2010)
Abstract
This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus B debate.
Keywords Clifford Williams  Metaphysics of time  B-theory  Transition
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References found in this work BETA
D. H. Mellor (1998). Transcendental Tense. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):29 - 56.
David Hugh Mellor (2001). The Time of Our Lives. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 48:45-59.

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