Descartes's Argument from Design
Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):333 - 345 (2008)
| Abstract | Descartes’s proof of the existence of God in the third ’Meditation’ can be interpreted as a version of the argument from design. He cannot point to the marvels of nature, since all he has after the second ’Meditation’ is his ideas, but his idea of God serves as the brilliantly designed entity that he claims he cannot have authored on his own. Several passages in his replies to commentators support this interpretation, and when one considers what Descartes believed he had deduced from this idea, it is understandable that he could consider it a wonderful idea | |||||||||
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