Evolution, teleology, intentionality

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):89-391 (1993)
Abstract
No response that was not as long and intricate as the two commentaries combined could do justice to their details, so what follows will satisfy nobody, myself included. I will concentrate on one issue discussed by both commentators: the relationship between evolution and teleological (or intentional) explanation. My response, in its brevity, may have just one virtue: it will confirm some of the hunches (or should I say suspicions) that these and other writers have entertained about my views. For more closely argued defenses of my points, see Dennett 1990a,b,c; 1991a,b.
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References found in this work BETA
J. Bennett (1991). How Is Cognitive Ethology Possible. In C. Ristau (ed.), Cognitive Ethology. The Minds of Other Animals. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers. 35-49.

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