David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 26 (1):19-34 (2013)
I offer an interpretation and a partial defense of Kit Fine's ‘Argument from Passage’, which is situated within his reconstruction of McTaggart's paradox. Fine argues that existing A-theoretic approaches to passage are no more dynamic, i.e. capture passage no better, than the B-theory. I argue that this comparative claim is correct. Our intuitive picture of passage, which inclines us towards A-theories, suggests more than coherent A-theories can deliver. In Finean terms, the picture requires not only Realism about tensed facts, but also Neutrality, i.e. the tensed facts not being ‘oriented towards’ one privileged time. However unlike Fine, and unlike others who advance McTaggartian arguments, I take McTaggart's paradox to indicate neither the need for a more dynamic theory of passage nor that time does not pass. A more dynamic theory is not to be had: Fine's ‘non-standard realism’ amounts to no more than a conceptual gesture. But instead of concluding that time does not pass, we should conclude that theories of passage cannot deliver the dynamicity of our intuitive picture. For this reason, a B-theoretic account of passage that simply identifies passage with the succession of times is a serious contender
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Daniel Deasy (2015). The Moving Spotlight Theory. Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2073-2089.
Natalja Deng (2015). On Whether B-Theoretic Atheists Should Fear Death. Philosophia 43 (4):1011-1021.
Martin A. Lipman (2015). On Fine’s Fragmentalism. Philosophical Studies 172 (12):3119-3133.
Daniel Deasy (2016). Philosophical Arguments Against the A‐Theory. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1).
Natalja Deng (2013). Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory. Erkenntnis 78 (4):713-726.
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