How could I be wrong? How wrong could I be?

One of the striking, even amusing, spectacles to be enjoyed at the many workshops and conferences on consciousness these days is the breathtaking overconfidence with which laypeople hold forth about the nature of consciousness Btheir own in particular, but everybody =s by extrapolation. Everybody =s an expert on consciousness, it seems, and it doesn =t take any knowledge of experimental findings to secure the home truths these people enunciate with such conviction
Keywords Consciousness  Infallibility  Metaphysics  Science  Wrong
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,774
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Daniel D. Hutto (2006). Turning Hard Problems on Their Heads. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):75-88.
Evan Thompson (2007). Look Again: Phenomenology and Mental Imagery. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):137-170.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Alan Strudler (2010). The Distinctive Wrong in Lying. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):171 - 179.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2012). Self-Ignorance. In JeeLoo Liu & John Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the Self. Cambridge University Press
Charles Fried (1978). Right and Wrong. Harvard University Press.
Garrett Cullity (2008). Public Goods and Fairness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):1 – 21.
Christopher Steinsvold (2010). Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253.
Eduardo Rivera-López (2006). Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):124-142.
Eduardo Rivera-lópez (2006). Can There Be Full Excuses for Morally Wrong Actions? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):124–142.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

245 ( #5,874 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

17 ( #43,751 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.