Intrinsic changes in experience: Swift and enormous

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):951-951 (1999)
Because, as Palmer shows, the only kinds of differences that can be detected are differences in relational structure, and relational structure is precisely what is preserved by isomorphism, his own arguments can be used to expose the incoherent motivation behind the traditional idea of “intrinsic qualities” of experience.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X99292217
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