In Defence of Magical Ersatzism

In Philosophical Quarterly. 161-74 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper, I attack David Lewis’s objection to a generic theory of modality he calls “Magical Ersatzism”. His objection takes the form of a dilemma directed at its linchpin, a relation he calls “selection”. This, he argues, must be either an internal or an external relation, but is unintelligible either way. However, his argument against classifying selection as internal is really just a version of the general problem of how we manage to grasp predicates in cases of underdetermination. This problem is not peculiar to Magical Ersatzism, and it is amenable to some familiar solutions. His argument against classifying selection as external is even worse off. He provides no compelling grounds for the putative unintelligibility and anyway it has a false presupposition. I conclude that Magical Ersatzism is still a viable option in the metaphysics of modality.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive David A. Denby, In Defence of Magical Ersatzism
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
Chapters BETA
References found in this work BETA
Peter Van Inwagen (1980). Indexicality and Actuality. Philosophical Review 89 (3):403 - 426.
David Lewis (1986). Against Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):25 – 46.
David Lewis (1984). Putnam's Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221 – 236.
Citations of this work BETA
Katherine Hawley (2010). Mereology, Modality and Magic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):117 – 133.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-02-05

Total downloads

86 ( #15,891 of 1,100,088 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #127,210 of 1,100,088 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.