Kant's ethics and duties to oneself

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (4):321–348 (1997)
This paper investigates the nature and foundation of duties to oneself in Kant's moral theory. Duties to oneself embody the requirement of the formula of humanity that agents respect rational nature in them-selves as well as in others. So understood, duties to oneself are not subject to the sorts of conceptual objections often raised against duties to oneself; nor do these duties support objections that Kant's moral theory is overly demanding or produces agents who are preoccupied with their own virtue. Duties to oneself emerge as an essential and compelling part of Kant's moral theory.
Keywords Kantian ethics  duties to oneself  formula of humanity
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00042
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John Kleinig (2016). The Paternalistic Principle. Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2):315-327.

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