Moral Harm and Moral Responsibility: A Defence of Ascriptivism

Ratio Juris 25 (2):149-179 (2012)
This paper investigates the relations between the concepts of moral harm and moral responsibility, arguing for a circularity between the two. On this basis the conceptual soundness of descriptivism, on which consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments are often grounded, is questioned. In the last section a certain version of ascriptivism is defended: The circularity is relevant in order to understand how a restricted version of ascriptivism may in fact be well founded
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9337.2012.00508.x
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