David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy 73 (4):619-623 (1998)
Metaphysicians often declare that there are large ontological differences (properties versus individuals, universals versus particulars) correlated with the linguistic distinction between names and verbs. Gaskin argues against all such declarations on the grounds that we may quantify with equal ease over the referents of both types of expression. However, his argument must be wrong, given the massive differences between first- and second-order qualification. Its only grain of truth is that these differences show up only in the logic of relations, and not also in monadic logic.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Richard Gaskin (1998). Predication and Ontology: Reply to Denyer. Philosophy 73 (4):624-628.
Nicholas Denyer (1998). Names, Verbs and Quantification. Philosophy 73 (286):619 - 623.
Peter Alward (2011). Description, Disagreement, and Fictional Names. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):423-448.
Fred Adams, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker (1997). The Semantics of Fictional Names. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2):128–148.
K. Gluer & P. Pagin (2012). Reply to Forbes. Analysis 72 (2):298-303.
Frank Jackson (2007). On Not Forgetting the Epistemology of Names. Grazer Philosophische Studien 74 (1):239-250.
Steven Pinker (1987). Productivity and Constraints in the Acquisition of the Passive. Cognition 26 (3):195-267.
Heidi Tiedke (2011). Proper Names and Their Fictional Uses. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):707 - 726.
Nicholas Denyer (1999). Names, Verbs and Quantification Again. Philosophy 74 (3):439-440.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #177,589 of 1,410,059 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #177,059 of 1,410,059 )
How can I increase my downloads?