Object and Property

Cambridge University Press (1996)
Abstract
Professor Arda Denkel argues here that objects are nothing more than bundles of properties. From this point of view he tackles some central questions of ontology: how is an object distinct from others; how does it remain the same while it changes through time? A second contention is that properties are particular entities restricted to the objects they inhabit. The appearance that they exist generally, in a multitude of things, is due to the way we conceptualise them. Other problems dealt with include how objects bear similarities by belonging to the same kinds, and how change in them is caused. Denkel defends a thoroughgoing particularism and offers purely qualitative accounts of individuation, identity, essences and matter. Throughout, the main alternative positions are surveyed, and the relevant historical background is traced.
Keywords Object (Philosophy  Essentialism (Philosophy  Causation
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Call number BD336.D46 1995
ISBN(s) 9780521550109   0521042097   0521550106   9780521042093
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Jonathan Schaffer (2003). The Problem of Free Mass: Must Properties Cluster? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):125–138.
E. J. Lowe (2000). Locke, Martin and Substance. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (201):499-514.

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