David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):13-25 (1988)
The intentional stance is the strategy of prediction and explanation that attributes beliefs, desires, and other states to systems and predicts future behavior from what it would be rational for an agent to do, given those beliefs and desires. Any system whose performance can be thus predicted and explained is an intentional system, whatever its innards. The strategy of treating parts of the world as intentional systems is the foundation of but is also exploited (and is virtually unavoidable) in artificial intelligence and cognitive science more generally, as well as in evolutionary theory. An analysis of the role of the intentional stance and its presuppositions supports a naturalistic theory of mental states and events, their content or intentionality, and the relation between levels of explanation and neurophysiological or mechanistic levels of explanation. As such, the analysis of the intentional stance grounds a theory of the mind and its relation to the body
|Keywords||Belief Intentionality Mental States Metaphysics Personal Identity Dennett, D|
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Citations of this work BETA
Derek Bolton (2001). Problems in the Definition of 'Mental Disorder'. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):182-199.
David Lumsden (2005). How Can a Symbol System Come Into Being? Dialogue 44 (1):87-96.
Andy Clark (1990). Belief, Opinion and Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):139-154.
Rebecca Dresser (1991). Review Essay / Making Up Our Minds: Can Law Survive Cognitive Science? Criminal Justice Ethics 10 (1):27-40.
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