Review of Fodor, psychosemantics
85:384-389 (1988)
| Abstract | In Word and Object, Quine acknowledged the "practical indispensability" in daily life of the intentional idioms of belief and desire but disparaged such talk as an "essentially dramatic idiom" rather than something from which real science could be made in any straightforward way.Endnote 1 Many who agree on little else have agreed with Quine about this, and have gone on to suggest one or another indirect way for science to accommodate folk psychology: Sellars, Davidson, Putnam, Rorty, Stich, the Churchlands, Schiffer and myself, to name a few. This fainthearted consensus is all wrong, according to Fodor, whose new book is a vigorous--even frantic--defense of what he calls Intentional Realism: beliefs and desires are real, causally involved, determinately contentful states. "We have no reason to doubt," Fodor says, "that it is possible to have a scientific psychology that vindicates commonsense belief/desire explanation." (p.16) | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,653 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore (1993). Is Intentional Ascription Intrinsically Normative? In B. Dahlbom (ed.), Dennett and His Critics. Blackwell.
Frederick R. Adams (1993). Fodor's Modal Argument. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):41-56.
Pat A. Manfredi (1993). Two Routes to Narrow Content: Both Dead Ends. Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):3-22.
Thomas D. Senor (1992). Two Factor Theories, Meaning Wholism and Intentionalistic Psychology: A Reply to Fodor. Philosophical Psychology 5 (2):133-151.
Hugh Clapin (1997). Problems with Principle P. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):261-77.
Lawrence J. Kaye (1994). The Computational Account of Belief. Erkenntnis 40 (2):137-53.
H. G. Callaway (1990). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 33 (2):251-59..
Ron McClamrock (1991). Methodological Individualism Considered as a Constitutive Principle of Scientific Inquiry. Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):343-54.
Nicholas P. Power (1996). Fodor's Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads193 ( #1,403 of 548,977 )Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #5,976 of 548,977 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
