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- Daniel C. Dennett (1991). Real Patterns. Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51.Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist.To read | Discuss | Edit | Categorize |File under..
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Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a most fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher-order or "reflective" propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credal sort. Reasons to hold "reflective beliefs" are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide (...)
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| Discuss | Edit | Categorize | File under.. | Export | Other links: cogprints.org cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk citebase.eprints.org firstsearch.oclc.org blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com | Scholar | More..
| | Other links: cogprints.org cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk citebase.eprints.org firstsearch.oclc.org blackwell-synergy.com ingentaconnect.com | Scholar | More.. Experiences and beliefs are different sorts of mental states, and are often taken to belong to very different domains. Experiences are paradigmatically phenomenal, characterized by what it is like to have them. Beliefs are paradigmatically intentional, characterized by their propositional content. But there are a number of crucial points where these domains intersect. One central locus of intersection arises from the existence of phenomenal beliefs: beliefs that are about experiences.
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