Seeing is believing--or is it?
In Kathleen Akins (ed.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press (1996)
| Abstract | We would all like to have a good theory of perception. Such a theory would account for all the known phenomena and predict novel phenomena, explaining everything in terms of processes occurring in nervous systems in accordance with the principles and laws already established by science: the principles of optics, physics, biochemistry, and the like. Such a theory might come to exist without our ever having to answer the awkward "philosophical" question that arises. | |||||||||
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