David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In John D. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology. Cambridge University Press. 135--148 (1991)
Let us begin with what all of us here agree on: folk psychology is not immune to revision. It has a certain vulnerability in principle. Any particular part of it might be overthrown and replaced by some other doctrine. Yet we disagree about how likely it is that that vulnerability in principle will turn into the actual demise of large portions--or all--of folk psychology. I am of the view that folk psychology is here for the long haul, and for some very good reasons. But I am not going to concentrate on that in my remarks. What nobody has bothered saying here yet, but is probably worth saying, is that for all of its blemishes, warts and perplexities, folk psychology is an extraordinarily powerful source of prediction. It is not just prodigiously powerful but remarkably easy for human beings to use. We are virtuoso exploiters of not so much a theory as a craft. That is, we might better call it a folk craft rather than a folk theory. The theory of folk psychology is the ideology about the craft, and there is lots of room, as anthropologists will remind us, for false ideology
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Alison Gopnik (1993). How We Know Our Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1.
M. Kusch (1997). The Sociophilosophy of Folk Psychology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 28 (1):1-25.
W. H. Dittrich & S. E. G. Lea (1993). Intentionality, Mind and Folk Psychology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.
Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (1993). The Fallibility of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):60.
Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye (1993). The Psychologist's Fallacy (and the Philosopher's Omission). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89.
Similar books and articles
Kristin Andrews (2007). Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology. In. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press. 191--209.
William Seager (1990). Instrumentalism in Psychology. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 4 (2):191 – 203.
G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
Tony Stone & Martin Davies (1998). Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:53-82.
David Braddon-Mitchell (2004). Folk Theories of the Third Kind. Ratio 17 (3):277-293.
Martin Davies & Tony Stone (1998). Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 42. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 53-82.
Frances Egan (1995). Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture. Philosophy of Science 62 (2):179-96.
Ian Ravenscroft, Folk Psychology as a Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads119 ( #8,316 of 1,102,773 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #20,958 of 1,102,773 )
How can I increase my downloads?