The fantasy of first-person science

A week ago, I heard James Conant give a talk at Tufts, entitled “Two Varieties of Skepticism” in which he distinguished two oft-confounded questions: " Descartes: How is it possible for me to tell whether a thought of mine is true or false, perception or dream? " Kant: How is it possible for something even to _be_ a thought? What are the conditions for the possibility of experience at all?
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Dan Zahavi (2007). Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):21-43.
Max Velmans (2007). Heterophenomenology Vs. Critical Phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):221-230.
Dan Zahavi (2007). Subjectivity and the First-Person Perspective. Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1):66-84.
Jérôme Dokic & Elisabeth Pacherie (2007). Too Much Ado About Belief. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):185-200.

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