Unifying the imperfective and the progressive: Partitions as quantificational domains [Book Review]

Linguistics and Philosophy 32 (5):475-521 (2009)
Abstract
This paper offers a new unified theory about the meaning of the imperfective and progressive aspects that builds on earlier of analyses in the literature that treat the imperfective as denoting a universal quantifier (e.g. Bonomi, Linguist Philos, 20(5):469–514, 1997; Cipria and Roberts, Nat Lang Semant 8(4):297–347, 2000). It is shown that the problems associated with such an analysis can be overcome if the domain of the universal quantifier is taken to be a partition of a future extending interval into equimeasured cells. Treating the partition-measure (the length of each partition-cell) as a contextually dependent variable allows for a unified treatment of the habitual and event-in-progress readings of the imperfective. It is argued that the contrast between the imperfective and the progressive has to do with whether the quantifier domain is a regular partition of the reference interval or a superinterval of the reference interval.
Keywords Imperfective  Progressive  Habitual  Genericity  Quantificational adverbs  Typological variation
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References found in this work BETA
Greg N. Carlson (1982). Generic Terms and Generic Sentences. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (2):145 - 181.

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