Consequence etiology and biological teleology in Aristotle and Darwin

Aristotle’s biological teleology is rooted in an epigenetic account of reproduction. As such, it is best interpreted by consequence etiology. I support this claim by citing the capacity of consequence etiology’s key distinctions to explain Aristotle’s opposition to Empedocles. There are implications for the relation between ancient and modern biology. The analysis reveals that in an important respect Darwin’s account of adaptation is closer to Aristotle’s than to Empedocles’s. They both rely on consequence etiological considerations to evade attributing the purposiveness of organisms to chance. Two implications follow: Darwinian explanations of adaptation are as teleological as Aristotle’s, albeit differently; and these differences show how deeply resistant Aristotle’s version of biological teleology is to descent from a common ancestor
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References found in this work BETA
Andre Ariew (2007). Teleology. In David L. Hull & Michael Ruse (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Philosophy of Biology. Cambridge University Press
D. M. Balme (1980). Aristotle's Biology Was Not Essentialist. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 62 (1):1-12.
Robert N. Brandon (1981). Biological Teleology: Questions and Explanations. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 12 (2):91-105.

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