Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives From Ethics and Epistemology

Oxford University Press (2003)
The idea of a virtue has traditionally been important in ethics, but only recently has gained attention as an idea that can explain how we ought to form beliefs as well as how we ought to act. Moral philosophers and epistemologists have different approaches to the idea of intellectual virtue; here, Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski bring work from both fields together for the first time to address all of the important issues. It will be required reading for anyone working on either side of the debate.
Keywords Virtue epistemology  Virtue
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Call number BD176.I58 2003
ISBN(s) 0199252734   9780199252732  
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Linda Zagzebski (2008). The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good. In Duncan Pritchard & Ram Neta (eds.), Metaphilosophy. Routledge 55.
Jennifer Lackey (2009). Knowledge and Credit. Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.

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