Online research in philosophy

O presente artigo visa expor efundamentar a necessidade de se articular, para além das diferenças que existam entre eles, os posicionamentos da hermenêutica de Hans-Georg Gadamer em relação às perspectivas abertas pela teoria crítica de Jürgen Habermas y Karl-Otto Apel, já que so assim se poderá adequadamente justificar a dinãmica do conhecimento humano bem como a sua constituiva dimensão critica. Mostra-se também como o debate entre Gadamer e Habermas logrou pôr a claw alguns dos mais importantes pontos de conexão entre ambos, o que nos permite aceder a uma perspectiva filosófica em que se associam o carácter histórico e flnito da razão e a dimensão crítica constitutiva da mesma. Desvanece-se, deste modo, a necessidade de se estabelecer uma alternativa insuperdvel entre "consciência hermenêutica" e "consciência critica ", ao mesmo tempo que se aclara a natureza da reflexão filosófica como sendo um procedimento interpretativo (hermenêutico) crítico em que, justamente por isso, ninguém pode aceder à pretensão de possuir a última palavra. /// This article seeks to establish the need of articulating the positioning of Gadamer's hermeneutics with the critical theory represented by Habermas and Apel. It is only on the basis of such an articulation that the dynamics of knowing can be seen to possess a critical dimension. The debate between Gadamer and Habermas succeeded in rendering explicit some of the points that enable us to envisage a philosophical perspective in which both the historicity of human reason and its critical dimension can be worked together. Thus, the need to establish an unsurpassable alternative between "hermeneutic consciousness" and "critical consciousness" simply disappears. At the same time, it becomes clear that philosophical reflexion itself consists of an interpretative procedure that is also critical in nature, along with the fact that no-one can claim to have the last word in this activity.

Gadamer and Habermas both argue that some earlier theorists of interpretation in the human sciences, despite recognizing the meaningful character of social reality, still succumb to objectivism because they fail to conceive the relation of interpreters to their subjects in terms of cross-cultural normative "dialogue." In particular, Gadamer and Habermas claim that the most prominent nineteenth-century philosopher of the human sciences, Wilhelm Dilthey, fell prey to a misleading Cartesian outlook which sought to ground the objectivity of interpretation on complete transcendence of the interpreter's present cultural and historical situation. This article challenges Gadamer's and Habermas's claim by arguing that new research on nineteenth-century hermeneutic thought reveals Dilthey to be much more aware of the reflexive, present-centered nature of historical research than they maintain and further that their own "dialogical" model of interpretation suffers from notable obscurities which Dilthey's work itself helps expose. Key Words: Dilthey • Gadamer • Habermas • hermeneutics.

This thesis explores the possibilities for normative grounding of authority through a focus on the relationship between Habermas’s ‘critical theory’ and Gadamer’s ‘philosophical hermeneutics’, with particular reference to the bases of authority in East Asian culture. More specifically, it examines the role of reason and tradition in justifying political authority. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics locates the conditions of authority in tradition, constituted in part by prejudice, while Habermas offers a theory of communicative action that transcends the limited horizons of tradition. The distinction between reason and tradition is applied in East Asian culture through an analysis of the practice of filial piety. The thesis endorses Habermas’s charge that Gadamer hypostatizes tradition. Habermas correctly identifies the political implication of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, namely, that it obscures power relations. It is argued that Habermas’s ‘communicative action theory’ and ‘discourse ethics’ are better able to do justice to the basis for the normative grounding of authority. The relevance of discourse ethics for the justification of political authority in East Asian culture is explored.

The rhetorical dimensions of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics have not been fully developed by his commentators, resulting in an overly conservative rendering of his philosophy. Drawing out the rhetorical features of his work, we find that Gadamer regards textual interpretation as a rhetorical accomplishment. This characterization leads to a rich conception of critical hermeneutics. The article develops Gadamer's rhetorical hermeneutics by contrasting his approach with Paul Ricoeur's famous intervention in the Gadamer-Habermas debate, and looks to Gadamer's account of legal practice as a manifestation of critical hermeneutics in action.

Freedom, Reason and History: The Hegelian heritage in Gadamer and Habermas. This essay aims at an elaboration of the theme of freedom by taking into account Gadamer"s and Habermas"s appropriation of Hegel. I will approach this theme by dividing it into three main topics: 1) The question of historical reconstruction of the idea(s) of freedom, 2) The question of justification of the idea of freedom, 3) The question of application (of the idea of freedom). The question of historical reconstruction will deal with the Gadamerian appropriation of Hegel"s idea of freedom in his concept of tradition. This will be confronted with Habermas"s twofold critique against Gadamer. Habermas claims that "tradition" could not be understood in a critical, that means, freedom-oriented way. He also claims that even a critical tradition would be one of many traditions, which leads to relativism. The question of justification will deal with Habermas"s and Gadamer"s approach to Hegel"s conception of freedom through recognition. The Habermasian approach to the Hegelian theme is a non-contextualised one, thereby aiming at a non-relative foundation for critical thinking. The third topic relates to the Gadamerian and also Habermasian question of how to apply a certain (non-contextual) freedom-based concept of recognition to different contexts. These last two topics relates to a Habermasian question of how to critically examine the freedom-potentials of a given context by using "freedom through recognition" as an ideal type, or standard.

This paper provides a detailed account of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and its relationship to contemporary problems in legal theory. I first demonstrate that Gadamer's approach charts a course between the inflated claims of critical legal studies and the subjectivism of the law and literature movement. I then interrogate the hermeneutical approach from the perspective of Habermas's critical theory. I conclude that Ricoeur's intervention in the Gadamer-Habermas debate helps significantly to draw out the critical elements of Gadamer's work. I conclude by developing new model of legal practice and theory grounded in the textuality of law.

While it is clear that the Gadamer–Habermas debate has had a major influence on Paul Ricoeur, his commentators have had little to say about the nature of this influence. I try to remedy this silence by showing that Ricoeur''s account of tradition is a direct response to the Gadamer–Habermas debate. First, I briefly explain the debate''s importance and describe Ricoeur''s reaction to it. Next, I show how his discussion of tradition in Time and Narrative steers a middle course between Gadamerian hermeneutics and Habermasian Ideologiekritik. Finally, I raise some critical questions about the adequacy of Ricoeur''s middle course. Specifically, I argue that it rests on an implausible distinction between the form and the content of tradition.