Truth matters: Normativity in thought and knowledge

If language and thought are to be taken as objective, they must respond to how the world is. I propose to explain this responsiveness in terms of conditions of correction, more precisely, by taking thoughts and linguistic utterances to be assessible as true or false. Furthermore, the paper is committed to a form of quietism according to which the very same thing that can be thought or expressed is the case: ‘soft facts’ as opposed to hard, free-standing facts, independent of any possible rational activity of grasping them
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DOI theoria200419214
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