David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 156 (2):311-336 (2007)
Alison Simmons, in Simmons (1999), argues that Descartes in Meditation Six offered a teleological account of sensory representation. According to Simmons, Descartes’ view is that the biological function of sensations explains both why sensations represent what they do (i.e., their referential content) and why they represent their objects the way they do (i.e., their presentational content). Moreover, Simmons claims that her account has several advantages over other currently available interpretations of Cartesian sensations. In this paper, I argue that Simmons’ teleological account cannot be sustained for both theoretical and textual reasons and that it does not have the advantages it is claimed to have.
|Keywords||Descartes Sensory representation Biological funtion|
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References found in this work BETA
Lilli Alanen (2003). Descartes's Concept of Mind. Harvard University Press.
Ronald Arbini (1983). Did Descartes Have a Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception? Journal of the History of Philosophy 21 (3):317-337.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Daniel Garber (1993). Descartes and Occasionalism. In Steven Nadler (ed.), Causation in Early Modern Philosophy. Penn State University Press. 9--26.
Geoffrey Gorham (2002). Descartes on the Innateness of All Ideas. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):355 - 388.
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