Cartesian sensations

Philosophy Compass 4 (5):780-792 (2009)
Abstract
Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on sensory representation.
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References found in this work BETA
Robert M. Adams (1975). Where Do Our Ideas Come From. In Stephen P. Stich (ed.), Innate Ideas. University of California Press. 71--87.
Raffaella de Rosa (2007). The Myth of Cartesian Qualia. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2):181�207.

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