Object-sensitivity versus cognitive penetrability of perception

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):87-107 (2013)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-012-9989-1
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
William F. Brewer (2015). Perception is Theory Laden: The Naturalized Evidence and Philosophical Implications. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 46 (1):121-138.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
John Zeimbekis (2013). Color and Cognitive Penetrability. Philosophical Studies 165 (1):167-175.
Philippe G. Schyns (1999). The Case for Cognitive Penetrability. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):394-395.
John Dilworth (2005). The Reflexive Theory of Perception. Behavior and Philosophy 33 (1):17-40.
Nicholas Shea (2015). Distinguishing Top-Down From Bottom-Up Effects. In D. Stokes, M. Matthen & S. Biggs (eds.), Perception and Its Modalities. Oxford University Press 73-91.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

70 ( #45,341 of 1,725,164 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

13 ( #53,143 of 1,725,164 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.