Ought we to follow our evidence?

Abstract
fits our evidence.[1] I will propose some potential counter-examples to test this evidentialist thesis. My main intention in presenting the “counter-examples” is to better understand Feldman’s evidentialism, and evidentialism in general. How are we to understand what our evidence is, how it works, and how are we to understand the phrase “epistemically ought to believe” such that evidentialism might make sense as a plausible thesis in light of the examples? Of course, we may decide that there’s no such way to understand evidentialism -- that it just isn’t a plausible thesis. I must admit that my suspicions lean in that direction. But the potential counter-examples are put forward, not in a refutational spirit (though I have nothing against good refutations in philosophy), but as an invitation to evidentialists and potential evidentialists to refine and/or explain their thesis in light of the at least apparent problems that the examples highlight
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David M. Holley (2013). Religious Disagreements and Epistemic Rationality. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.
Ram Neta (2003). Contextualism and the Problem of the External World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):1–31.

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