David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 119 (473):1 - 42 (2010)
Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will (likely) happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between 'straightforward' future-directed conditionals like ' If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby' and * "w e r e ' ' e d F D C s like ' If the house were not to be painted, it would soon look quite shabby': an account on which both of these types of FDCs are grouped with the indicatives for semantic treatment and on which, while conditionals of both types are properly used in means/ends deliberations, those of the ' were'ed-up variety are especially well suited for that purpose
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (2002). Assertion, Knowledge, and Context. Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Dorothy Edgington (1995). On Conditionals. Mind 104 (414):235-329.
David Lewis (1979). Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow. Noûs 13 (4):455-476.
David Lewis (1976). Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. Philosophical Review 85 (3):297-315.
Robert Stalnaker (1975). Indicative Conditionals. Philosophia 5 (3):269-286.
Citations of this work BETA
Alan Hájek (2012). The Fall of “Adams' Thesis”? Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):145-161.
Caspar Hare (2011). Obligation and Regret When There is No Fact of the Matter About What Would Have Happened If You Had Not Done What You Did. Noûs 45 (1):190 - 206.
Ken Perszyk (2013). Recent Work on Molinism. Philosophy Compass 8 (8):755-770.
Caspar Hare & Brian Hedden (2016). Self‐Reinforcing and Self‐Frustrating Decisions. Noûs 50 (3):604-628.
Mark Thomas Walker (2014). The Real Reason Why the Prisoner's Dilemma is Not a Newcomb Problem. Philosophia 42 (3):841-859.
Similar books and articles
Martin Smith (2007). Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy. Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):97 - 121.
Daniel Nolan (2003). Defending a Possible-Worlds Account of Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 116 (3):215-269.
Frank Jackson (ed.) (1991). Conditionals. Oxford University Press.
Michela Ippolito (2006). Semantic Composition and Presupposition Projection in Subjunctive Conditionals. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (6):631 - 672.
Eric Swanson (2013). Subjunctive Biscuit and Stand-Off Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):637-648.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads117 ( #33,828 of 1,911,494 )
Recent downloads (6 months)9 ( #69,332 of 1,911,494 )
How can I increase my downloads?