The ordinary language basis for contextualism, and the new invariantism

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198 (2005)
Abstract
I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.
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    References found in this work BETA
    David Lewis (2000). Causation as Influence. Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Avner Baz (2009). Who Knows? European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.

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