The seven sins of pseudo-science

In this paper I will argue that a profile of the pseudo-sciences can be gained from the scientific pretensions of the pseudo-scientist. These pretensions provide two yardsticks which together take care of the charge of scientific prejudice that any suggested demarcation of pseudo-science has to face. To demonstrate that my analysis has teeth I will apply it to Freud and modern-day Bach-kabbalists. Against Laudan I will argue that the problem of demarcation is not a pseudo-problem, though the discussion will bear out that Laudan's replacement question, namely the question whether someone's theory is well-confirmed, is not, as Lugg claimed, independent of the question as to whether that person is a pseudo-scientist. I further argue that my prototype pseudo-scientists do not have the shortcomings highlighted in Thagard's recent analysis of pseudo-science
Keywords demarcation criterion  science  pseudo-science  Bach-kabbalists  Freud  Laudan  Lugg  Popper  Thagard
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DOI 10.2307/25170950
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Sven Ove Hansson (2009). Cutting the Gordian Knot of Demarcation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (3):237-243.
Anthony A. Derksen (2005). Dennett's Rhetorical Strategies in Consciousness Explained. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 36 (1):29-48.

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