Can One Get Bivalence from (Tarskian) Truth and Falsity?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):273-282 (2009)
Timothy Williamson famously offered an argument from these Tarskian principles in favor of bivalence. I show, dwelling on (Andjelkovic & Williamson, 2000), that the argument depends on a contentious formulation of the Tarskian principles about truth (and falsity), which the supervaluationist can reject without jeopardizing the Tarskian insight. In the mentioned paper, Adjelkovic and Williamson argue that, even if the appropriate formulation seems to make room for failure of bivalence in borderline cases, this appearance is illusory, once one grants an independent further principle involving biconditionals. I finally argue that the formulation of this is, however, contentious in a similar manner.
Keywords Bivalence  Supervaluationism  Tarskian Truth  Vagueness
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.0.0048
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Hartry Field (2003). No Fact of the Matter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):457 – 480.

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