Hume and Newton
Philosophy and Theology 6 (1):21-38 (1991)
| Abstract | I argue that, while Hume’s approach to Newton is sometimes critical and sometimes not, Hume’s position with regard to newtonian method is coherent overall. Rather than speaking of two Humes (one a newtonian, the other not), from an humean perspective we should rather speak of two Newtons: the positivist and the theologian | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesGraciela de Pierris (2006). Hume and Locke on Scientific Methodology. Hume Studies 32 (2):277-329.
James Hill (2012). How Hume Became 'The New Hume': A Developmental Approach. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10 (2):163-181.
Andrew Janiak & Eric Schliesser (eds.) (2012). Interpreting Newton: Critical Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Tamás Demeter (forthcoming). Post-Mechanical Explanation in the Natural and Moral Sciences: The Language of Nature and Human Nature in David Hume and William Cullen. Jahrbuch für Europäische Wissenschaftskultur.
Eugene Sapadin (1997). A Note on Newton, Boyle, and Hume's “Experimental Method”. Hume Studies 23 (2):337-344.
Angela Coventry (2005). A Re-Examination of Hume’s Debt to Newton. Ensaios Sobre Hume.
Stanley Tweyman (1993). Hurlbutt, Hume, Newton and the Design Argument. Hume Studies 19 (1):167-175.
James E. Force (1987). Hume's Interest in Newton and Science. Hume Studies 13 (2):166-216.
Jane L. McIntyre (1994). Hume: Second Newton of the Moral Sciences. Hume Studies 20 (1):3-18.
Eric Schliesser (2007). 11. “Two Definitions of ‘Cause,’ Newton, and the Significance of the Humean Distinction Between Natural and Philosophical Relations,”. Journal of Scottish Philosophy, 5 (1):83-101.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2011-01-09Total downloads4 ( #180,404 of 556,837 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #39,010 of 556,837 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
