Is 'everything' precise?

Dialectica 60 (4):397–409 (2006)
There are certain metaphysically interesting arguments ‘from vagueness’, for unrestricted mereological composition and for four-dimensionalism, which involve a claim to the effect that idioms for unrestricted quantification are precise. An elaboration of Lewis’ argument for this claim, which assumes the view of vagueness as semantic indecision, is presented. It is argued that the argument also works according to other views on the nature of vagueness, which also require for an expression to be vague that there are different admissible alternatives of the relevant sort, such as epistemicism, as defended by Williamson. Recent attempts to resist the argument are discussed and rejected.
Keywords vagueness  everything  quantification
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01077.x
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References found in this work BETA
Eli Hirsch (2002). Quantifier Variance and Realism. Philosophical Issues 12 (1):51-73.
Timothy Williamson (2003). Everything. Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.

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