(Indexical) Relativism about Values: A Presuppositional Defense

Abstract
A general characterization of relativism about values is presented, in terms of there being conceivable irremovable divergences that are faultless in that domain. An indexical version of relativism is distinguished, which is entailed by the the Lewisian, flexible account of values. The paper offers a defense of indexical relativism from the objection that it cannot account for the facts involving intuitions about disagreement, revealed in ordinary disputes about values. The defense exploits a presuppositional component congenial to the Lewisian proposal, to the effect that the addressees are disposed to value relevantly like the speaker
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