David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Noûs 42 (4):746 - 752 (2008)
Kilimanjaro is a paradigmatic mountain, if any is. Consider atom Sparky, which is neither determinately part of Kilimanjaro nor determinately not part of it. Let Kilimanjaro(+) be the body of land constituted, in the way mountains are constituted by their constituent atoms, by the atoms that make up Kilimanjaro together with Sparky, and Kilimanjaro(–) the one constituted by those other than Sparky. On the one hand, there seems to be just one mountain in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro. On the other hand, both Kilimanjaro(+) and Kilimanjaro(–)—and indeed many other similar things—seem to have an equal claim to be a mountain: all of them exhibit the grounds for something being a mountain—like being an elevation of the earth’s surface rising abruptly and to a large height from the surrounding level,1 or whathaveyou—; and there seems to be nothing in the vicinity with a better claim. Hence, the problem of the many
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Vann McGee & Brian P. McLaughlin (2000). The Lessons of the Many. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):129-151.
Theodore Sider (2001). Maximality and Intrinsic Properties. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):357 - 364.
Peter Unger (1980). The Problem of the Many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):411-468.
Achille Varzi (2001). Vagueness in Geography. Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):49 – 65.
Brian Weatherson (2003). Many Many Problems. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):481–501.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Han-Kyul Kim (2008). Locke and the Mind-Body Problem: An Interpretation of His Agnosticism. Philosophy 83 (4):439-458.
Alex Byrne (2006). Color and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.
Dan López de Sa (2014). Lewis Vs Lewis on the Problem of the Many. Synthese 191 (6):1105-1117.
Roy Sorensen (2000). Moore's Problem with Iterated Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):28-43.
Thomas Hofweber (2009). The Meta-Problem of Change. Noûs 43 (2):286 - 314.
Thomas Sattig (2010). Many as One. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 5:145-178.
Robert Williams (2006). An Argument for the Many. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (1):411-419.
Dan López de Sa (2008). Is the Problem of the Many a Problem in Metaphysics? Noûs 42 (4):746-752.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads3 ( #273,092 of 1,096,462 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #139,663 of 1,096,462 )
How can I increase my downloads?