Lewis vs Lewis on the problem of the many
| Abstract | Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seem to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim to being a cat, and there seems to be nothing in the vicinity with a better claim. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the second, the many are all cats, but they are almost identical to each other, and hence they are almost one. For Lewis, the two solutions do not compete with each other but are mutually complementary, as each can assist the other. This paper has two aims: first to argue against the first of these two solutions, and then to defend the second as a self-standing solution from Lewis’s considerations to the contrary. In both parts I will assume the certainly plausible but also controversial view on the nature of vagueness, having it that vagueness is a kind of semantic indecision—of which Lewis himself is one of the main defenders. | |||||||||
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