David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126 (2001)
Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony.
|Keywords||axiology emotions ethical naturalism foundations of ethics sentimentalism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Hanno Sauer (2012). Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Bruce Maxwell & Leonie le Sage (2009). Are Psychopaths Morally Sensitive? Journal of Moral Education 38 (1):75-91.
Kristjan Kristjansson (2009). Putting Emotion Into the Self: A Response to the 2008 Journal of Moral Education Special Issue on Moral Functioning. Journal of Moral Education 38 (3):255-270.
Bruce Maxwell & Roland Reichenbach (2007). Educating Moral Emotions: A Praxiological Analysis. [REVIEW] Studies in Philosophy and Education 26 (2):147-163.
Kristján Kristjánsson (2010). Emotion Education Without Ontological Commitment? Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (3):259-274.
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